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Abstract Using information from the balance sheets of Spanish banks between 1995
and 2009 matched to credit information at the bank-industry and bank-firm level,
we estimate the average impact of current and anticipated changes in banks’ capital
on lending to firms. We isolate the role of credit supply factors using the variation
in capital growth associated with the bank-specific historical exposure to real estate
development and its interaction with the change in house prices in the provinces where
the banks operate.We control for the quality of borrowers by using region and industry
fixed effects. A 1% increase in capital growth increases business lending to non-real
estate firms by between 0.7 and 0.8%—a limited magnitude when set against the
literature. The relatively small magnitude of credit supply factors may be explained
by the weakness of loan demand in a context of deep recession.
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1 Introduction
The role of bank balance sheets in shaping credit growth received substantial attention
during the 2008 recession. On the one hand, exposure to “toxic” assets affected some
banks’ ability to lend (see Puri et al. 2011). On the other hand, even in banking systems
without structured off-balance sheet products, but with a high exposure to real estate,
drops in house prices have impaired financial intermediaries’ capital positions and,
possibly, the overall supply of credit. This paper analyses the case of Spain, an economy
that experienced a housing boom until 2007 and a drop in business lending in 2009,
to gauge the impact of (current and anticipated) changes in bank capital on business
lending.1
The Spanish financial system was not severely hit by the first wave of the global
financial crisis, as a result of a number of factors: the negligible presence of toxic assets
on bank balance sheets; regulations that prevented the creation of off-balance sheet
investment vehicles; and the large weight of long-term instruments in their funding
structure. However, as the initial financial turmoil turned into a deep recession, Spanish
banks were increasingly affected as their high exposure to the real estate sector and
the sharp increase in unemployment led to a major deterioration in the quality of
their loan portfolios. The existence of provisioning buffers required by the Spanish
prudential regulatory system initially mitigated the impact on profits of the surge in
non-performing loans.Nevertheless, the progressive reduction in these buffers together
with increases in the target capital ratios considered acceptable by regulators and
markets have put additional pressure on banks’ capital. All these developments may
have constrained the credit supply of some institutions.
Disentangling the specific contribution of bank capital from demand-related factors
is a difficult task. In a time series context, firms revise downward their investment plans
and, consequently, their demand for loans. At the same time, bank capital and borrower
creditworthiness deteriorate in a recession, so stricter lending standards are applied
by financial institutions. Alternatively, in a cross-section context, banks and firms do
not match randomly and it may be the case that firms whose demand for credit is most
sensitive to recessions end up borrowing from the smallest and least capitalized banks.
Our strategy is the following. Firstly, guided by a simple model of bank behavior
that predicts that lending growth is conditioned by capital growth only when the level
of capital is near the amount required either by the regulator or the fundingmarkets, we
study two different channels through which the capital position of a bank may affect
its lending behavior (see Van den Heuvel 2001). The first relates changes in lending to
firms to current changes in the capital position of a bank. The second is highlighted in
the literature on bank lending under uncertainty and captures cuts in lending associated
with anticipated future reductions in capital stemming from expected losses.
Secondly, to identify the role of supply factors in business lending, we use financial
statements (balance sheets and profit and loss accounts) reported by the Spanish depos-
itory institutions to the supervisor between 1995 and 2010. We match this information
1 For instance, Puri et al. (2011) show that German regional banks that were more exposed to subprime
lending in the US were more likely to reject applications of consumer and mortgage loans. Our paper
focuses on business loans.
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to data on business lending at the bank-industry level and, as a robustness check, to
data at the bank-loan level. We then use an instrumental variable procedure along with
industry-year and firm-year fixed effects to address the simultaneity between lending
and capital. Our instrument is based on Watanabe (2007) and relies on bank-specific
exposure to real estate development as of 1995. The underlying idea is that, unlike
banks that enter the real estate development industry during a housing boom, banks
with a traditionally high exposure to real estate development are likely to better know
the industry than the rest, but possibly due to relationship lending, they are more likely
to be exposed to the ups and downs of real estate prices. That fact, combined with
whether or not these banks operate in areas that experienced house price declines,
permits us to track the changes in banks’ capital position for reasons unlikely to be
related to the quality of firms’ demand for loans as of 2007.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, lagged exposure to real estate
development and its interaction with local house prices in the provinces where banks
operate are good predictors of capital growth only after 2008, when house prices had
accumulated two years of negative growth at the national level. Secondly, those same
instruments predict changes in the overall non-performing loans (NPL) ratio already
in 2008. We find that the exposure to real estate and its interaction with house prices
predicts the NPL ratio only in the real estate development sector and for banks that
operated in provinces where housing prices fell. Finally, we find that banks that were
more exposed to real estate developers cut their lending to a larger extent during the
recession, and that the drop in business lending was mitigated if the banks operated
in provinces where house prices fell less. These results hold in analyses performed
at matched bank-industry level, but also in specifications using matched bank-loan
data that control for the quality of the borrower by means of firm-year fixed effects.
Interestingly, using firm level data, we find rather similar cuts in lending across all
firms, independently of their size.
Finally, we estimate two stage least squares (TSLS) models of credit growth on
current and (proxies of) anticipated capital growth. We find a statistically significant
elasticity of business lending to actual capital growth of about 0.7–0.8. Nevertheless,
back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest a limited role for the capital channel during
the sample period we consider (accounting for 18–21% of the actual credit reduction).
Overall, our preferred estimates suggest that the deterioration of banks’ capital position
has had a negative but limited effect on the supply of loans to firms.
Wemake three distinct contributions. Firstly, we contribute to the debate on the role
of house price dynamics in bank balance sheets and business credit. Gan (2007) finds
that Japanese banks that were more exposed to real estate development cut business
lending after a sizable fall in aggregate real estate prices. However, Chaney et al.
(2012) or Cuñat et al. (2014) advocate the use of local house prices to study balance
sheet effects, as aggregate prices may correlate with macro factors such as exchange
rates. Chaney et al. (2012) find that shocks to the value of firms’ collateral diminish
investment while Cuñat et al. (2014) document that banks cut their lending in response
to local house price drops. We estimate how local house prices and banks’ exposure
to real estate development affect capital growth, NPLs and loans granted by banks.
We also document that house price increases did not affect capital or business lending
growth, but house price reductions actually did. Secondly, we find that house prices
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in the provinces where a bank operates affect business lending even when the prices
in the locality where firms operate hold constant. That finding suggests that changes
in local house prices spread to other regions through banks’ balance sheets.
Secondly, and due to Spanish regulations, the dynamic provisioning system allows
us to separate the role of contemporary and anticipated capital growth in determining
the changes in business credit. The stylized model we use delivers quantitative predic-
tions on the impact of capital growth on business credit; it should be bounded between
zero and one. That is not necessarily the case when anticipated capital growth is not
held constant.
Finally, our results cast light on possible reasons for the discrepancies among exist-
ing estimates of the role of bank capital in determining business credit. Berrospide
and Edge (2010) use aggregate data and find a very limited role for bank capital asset
ratios in business lending growth. Using loan level data, Albertazzi and Marchetti
(2010) and Jiménez et al. (2012) find larger impacts made by banks’ balance sheets.
The discrepancy among those results could either be due to cross-country differ-
ences in the dependence of firms on bank lending or, alternatively, to differences in
the level of data disaggregation. The availability of comprehensive loan-level and
of aggregate data allows the response of lending growth to balance sheet shocks
to be estimated using data on business loans granted both at the bank-loan and at
the bank-industry level. The response of credit growth to banks’ exposure to real
estate development and its interaction with local house prices does not depend greatly
either on the degree of the data aggregation or on whether or not we control for the
quality of borrowers by means of firm-year fixed effects. Hence, the heterogeneity
in responses across studies may depend more on the extent to which firms depend
on banks for their funding or on the nature of the shocks that affect bank balance
sheets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief
review of the recent literature analyzing the influence of a bank’s capital position on
its lending provision. Section 3 describes the theoretical framework and our empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents the procedure used to address the potential simultaneity
of capital and lending, and describes the data sources and the variables included in the
empirical specifications. Section 5 discusses the results obtainedwhile Sect. 6 provides
some robustness checks at the bank level. Section 7 examines loan level outcomes.
Finally, Sect. 8 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Bank capital and lending growth: an overview of the empirical literature
The detailed theoretical model linking bank capital and bank lending operates through
capital regulation. This bank capital channel is explicitly modeled by (Van den Heuvel
2001, 2002).Assumingboth an imperfectmarket for bank equity and risk-based capital
requirements, he shows that when capital drops to a sufficiently low level, as a result
of an increase in loan losses, the bank will reduce lending because of the capital
requirement and the cost of issuing new equity. Capital does not necessarily need to
fall below the capital requirement to trigger a reduction in lending, as the bank might
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prefer to forgo some lending opportunities in order to reduce the risk of breaching the
capital regulatory limit in the future.
On the empirical side, the impact of bank capital on loan growth has been a highly
researched area in specific episodes of credit slowdown. In particular, a number of
papers explored the role of the introduction of new bank capital regulations (Basel
I) in explaining the credit slowdown in the early 1990s in the US economy. These
studies did not provide a conclusive answer on the potential existence of a bank-
capital-induced credit crunch. Bernanke and Lown (1991), using a cross-section of
year on year growth rates for 1991:Q1 found that actual capital-to-asset ratios had a
significant effect on loan growth, although the relevance of this effect was significantly
lower than that of economic activity. Berger and Udell (1994) did not find a significant
effect of alternative definitions of capital ratios on loan growth during the period 1990–
1992. By contrast, Hancock and Wilcox (1993) found, for a sample of US banks in
1990, that shortfalls in capital ratios (measured in relative terms to a target level) had
a significant effect on loan growth.
Using an alternative approach and a sample of banks inNewEngland over the period
1989:Q2 to 1994:Q4, Peek and Rosengreen (1995) found that capital growth was the
main determinant of lending growth for a sample of banks with low regulatory ratings
(and hence presumably constrained), whereas it did not have a significant effect for
the a priori unconstrained banks. Given the large number of banks with low regulatory
ratings in New England in the early 1990s, these authors argue that capital constraints
may have played an important role in the sluggish lending growth and weak economic
activity at that time. Their estimates suggest that a 1% point increase in capital growth
raised the supply of credit (among low regulatory ratings banks) by 5% points. We
discuss below that the magnitude of that impact is very large.
Several papers have analyzed whether or not the weakness of lending growth might
be related to the demand by the Japanese regulator for a rigorous self-assessment of
their assets, which led to a substantial amount of loan loss write-offs and provisions.
Focusing on that later development, Woo (2003) and Watanabe (2007) found that
Japanese banks significantly reduced their lending in response to a large increase in
bank capital requirements resulting from the reinforcement of the prudential policy
guidelines by the Japanese regulator. Watanabe’s results suggest a very large role
was played by the contraction of capital in business lending: had capital not been
squeezed, business lending to sound industries (which indeed fell, depending on the
industry, between 3 and 5% points) would actually have increased. Instead of looking
at regulatory changes, we analyze the impact of changes in bank capital associated to
changes in house prices at the onset of a (severe) recession.
The magnitude of the current financial crisis has renewed the interest in this litera-
ture. Some recent papers have shed some light on the relevance of the effect of bank
capital on lending growth during the current crisis. However, their results are far from
being conclusive, mostly because the crisis or, at least, its effects on bank balance-
sheets, were still under way. Using a sample of US bank holding companies over the
period 1992:Q1 to 2008:Q3, Berrospide and Edge (2010) find small effects of capi-
tal surpluses/shortfalls on lending. Larger effects are found by Francis and Osborne
(2009) using a sample of U.K. banks over the period 1996:Q2 to 2007:Q4 and a similar
methodology to that in Berrospide and Edge (a panel regression of loan growth on the
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deviation of bank capital with respect to a target). Albertazzi and Marchetti (2010)
use highly detailed data on bank-firm relationships (compiled by the credit register
of the Banca d’Italia) and find that those banks with poor capitalization displayed a
higher contraction in bank lending over the period from September 2008 (just after
the collapse of Lehman Brothers) to March 2009. Jiménez et al. (2012) estimate large
impacts of monetary shocks on loan granting decisions of bank with relatively low
capital asset and liquidity ratios. Among other factors, the discrepancies among those
results could be due to differences in the level of disaggregation of the data (loan level
data vs bank balance sheets) or to the nature of the shocks considered in each paper.
Our study conducts the analysis at several levels of disaggregation to cast light on the
role of those components.
3 The link between bank’s capital and lending to firms
Most of the empirical work that assesses the role of supply factors in explaining
lending developments uses a reduced form relationship between loan growth and
a capital ratio. In addition, some studies, like Watanabe (2007) or Berrospide and
Edge (2010) attempt to measure banks’ capital surplus, i.e. the difference between the
observed and the desired capital ratios. By contrast, in theoretical models of corporate
finance, decisions are usually modeled in terms of capital levels rather than in terms of
capital-asset ratios. We use a simple model of bank behavior to derive a relationship
between the growth rate of lending and the growth rate of capital that does not require
measuring an exact measure of the bank’s capital surplus.
3.1 A simple model of bank behavior
We use a multi-period stylized model of bank behavior based on Van den Heuvel
(2001)—see Appendix 1 for the details. The bank holds only loans (Lt ), and has two
types of liabilities, capital (Kt ) and deposits (Dt ). The bank also faces an inelastic
demand for deposits at a given rate rD and chooses its level of capital and loans, while
its yearly profits can be written as follows:
πt = [R(Lt )Lt − rD Dt ]
The capital of a bank Kt evolves as follows:
Kt = Kt−1 + (1 − τ)πt − dt
where τ is the corporate tax- and dt is a dividend. The constraint implies that banks can
only increase capital through retained post-tax profits πt (1− τ). In addition, banking
regulations require banks to have a minimum level of capital that depends on the total
outstanding credit amount Lt
Kt ≥ γ R Lt
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We assume that whenever capital falls below its regulatory minimum γ R , banks are
not allowed to extend new loans or to pay dividends, thus forgoing profitable lending
opportunities. The bank maximizes the discounted stream of future dividends subject
to the evolution of capital and to the capital regulatory constraint.
Several reasons lead lending institutions to hold a capital level that exceeds the time
invariant capital asset ratio γ R . Firstly, Spanish supervisory authorities require banks
to keep an extra layer of capital associated to “dynamic provisioning”, described in
Sect. 3.2.1. Even in such a simple setting, minimum capital requirements consist of a
time invariant component γ R and of a time-varying counter-cyclical buffer capturing
dynamic provisioning—that we term γ Ut . Secondly, banks may have their own assess-
ment of the distribution of future losses and may keep an extra layer of reserves as Tier
1 capital.2 Finally, financial markets condition their lending upon certain characteris-
tics of the borrowing bank, such as its capital-asset ratio.3 Those considerations lead
us to model the magnitude capital buffer γ Ut as a function of expected losses as well
as on the cost of deposits rD . The level of capital Kt must then exceed that implied
by the capital-asset ratio required by the regulator (γ R Lt ) by an additional, possibly
time varying, ratio (γ Ut Lt ).
4
Kt ≥ (γ R + γ Ut )Lt
We note three results
Result 1 When the capital constraint is binding and the desired amount L∗t is such
that Kt < (γ R + γ Ut )L∗t , lending growth is equal to the growth of bank’s capital
 log Lt =  log 1
γ R + γ Ut
+  log Kt (1)
That is, if we were able to identify which banks face a capital constraint in the
data, and used that sample of constrained banks to run a cross-sectional regression of
 log Lt on  log 1
γ R+γ Ut and  log Kt , the coefficient of the latter variable would be
one. That is, among capital constrained banks, loan growth equals capital growth.
Result 2 If Kt ≥ (γ R + γ Ut )L∗t , lending growth reflects the growth in the mar-
ginal benefit from lending relative to the marginal cost of funds. Neither of those
magnitudes depends on capital growth. Assuming again that we were able to identify
which banks do not face any capital constraint, a cross-sectional regression of log Lt
on  log 1
γ R+γ Ut and  log Kt ran in that sample would deliver a zero coefficient of
 log Kt .
2 Van den Heuvel’s model is similar to the one above, but there banks are uncertain about the cost of their
own borrowing and about the distribution of future losses. In his model banks accumulate extra capital to
insure against the risk of being capital constrained in the future.
3 However, we note that reserves due to dynamic provisioning belong to Tier 2 capital, while the empirical
analysis uses Tier 1 capital.
4 The empirical applicationmodels the current share of non-performing loans (NPLs) as amain component
of γ Ut , in turn, a predictor of future losses and of future negative additions to capital.
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Result 3 The coefficient of  log Kt in a cross-sectional regression of  log Lt on
 log 1
γ R+γ Ut and  log Kt must be bounded between 0 and 1. The coefficient would
be zero if no bank faced a capital constraint and one if all banks faced such constraint.
Peek and Rosengreen (1995) use a cross-section of banks and show that capital growth
affects business lending only because current capital falls between the legal minimum
and the desired level of capital for a fraction of banks. Our strategy builds on that
result, but places bounds on the coefficient of  log Kt .
Note that banks with capital levels above the regulatory minimum may cut lending
because of an anticipation effect or because of changes in capital requirements by
financial markets. In either case, banks anticipate future capital needs and thus target a
lower ratio of business lending to capital. The coefficient of the variable  log 1
γ R+γ Ut
identifies that response. In addition, by regressing  log Lt on  log 1
γ R+γ Ut and on
 log Kt we abstract from the difficult problem of estimating a bank specific target
capital, because such a term is left implicit in  log 1
γ R+γ Ut . Watanabe (2007) or
Berrospide and Edge (2010) highlight the difficulties inherent in estimating target
capital levels.
3.2 Empirical implementation and identification strategy
We work with year-specific regressions of business lending growth on capital growth
and changes in the share of non-performing loans between 2004 and 2010. The main
unit of analysis is the bank-industry cell, but we also experiment with matched bank-
firm data in a separate analysis. Namely, we implement the following version of (1)
 log Lt = β1 log(γ R) + β1 log(γ Ut ) + β2 log Kt + εt (2)
β1 multiplies the first two terms as both enter additively in (1). Result 3 above
shows that Eq. (2) is an average of the responses of capital-constrained banks (for
whom β1and β2 are both equal to 1) and capital unconstrained banks (for which both
coefficients are zero). β2 measures the sensitivity of loan growth to capital growth
and, as discussed above, it must lie between zero and one.
3.2.1 Proxies for  log(γ Ut )
We treat  log(γ R) as a constant because the regulatory capital-to-asset ratio did not
change during the sample period. However,  log(γ Ut )—the capital buffer that a bank
holds in excess of the regulatory minimum—is a relevant, unobserved regressor. We
model γ Ut as a year-specific function of expected future losses (that we identify with
the share of non-performing loans) and of the lagged capital asset ratio (that determines
the market’s perception of the situation of the bank and, in turn, the cost of borrowing).
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The dependence of γ Ut onN P Lt is due to regulatory reasons. In 2000, the Banco
de España set up a system of “dynamic provisioning”. According to that regulation, in
expansionary periods when the share of NPLs falls below an historical average banks
are required to set aside a class of general-purpose loan provisions (i.e., provisions
against a loan default that has not occurred yet). Conversely, when the share of NPLs
is above an historical average—typically, during a recession—banks may set aside
a lower level of general-purpose provisions.5 At the beginning of a recession, the
ratio of non-performing loans typically increases, but that change is compensated by
a lower need to set aside general-purpose provisions. Hence, an increase in the share
of NPLs will not instantaneously reduce profits or capital growth.6 The system of
dynamic provisioning implies that the effect on lending of sharp increases in the share
of NPLs—-like those observed in the period we analyze—are conceptually distinct
from current changes in capital. The distinction allows us to distinguish between
anticipatory and pure capital growth effects.




we have abstracted from differences across banks in the cost of raising funds. Yet,
banks with a higher volume of capital may be able to obtain lower financing rates in
the funding markets. In such a case, capital growth would also be positively related
with loan growth among unconstrained banks.7 We account then for differences in the
cost of raising funds by including the capital asset ratio its asset size, both measured
as of 1995.
3.2.2 Identification
Capital growth and loan growth are simultaneously determined over the business cycle.
In an economic downturn the quality of the demand for loans falls (reflecting weaker
activity) and the capital of banks diminishes as well (as a result of an increase in
non-performing loans). To estimate causal, separate effects of capital growth and of
changes in 1
γ R+γ Ut on loan growth, we use an instrumental variable procedure. A valid
instrument must be correlated with the growth of capital while uncorrelated with the
quality of borrowers in 2009.
5 The formula that governs the evolution of those general-purpose provisions, or provisions against unre-
alized losses is
Pt = Pt−1 + ρ[N P Let − N P Lt ] + [N P Let − N P Let−1]
Pt represents the euro amount of general-purpose provisions (as opposed to loan-specific ones) that the
bank must set aside in period t. N P Lt is the actual losses due to loans that were not repaid during period t .
N P Let represents a smooth function of expected losses through the business cycle. ρ is a parameter between
zero and one that depends on the type of loan.
The working assumption is that in a period when N P Let > N P Lt , realized losses are below average, so the
overall portfolio of loans must contain a fraction of loans that will default in the future. Those latent losses
justify extra provisioning when N P Lt is below average. The converse happens when N P Let < N P Lt .
6 However, such losses anticipate capital needs in the future if the increase in the share ofNPLs is persistent.
7 Peek and Rosengreen (1995) explicit incorporate heterogeneity in the cost of raising funds in their
theoretical framework. They show that the response of loan growth to capital growth is larger among
constrained banks than among unconstrained banks.
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The dynamics of capital accumulation suggests that any shock that increases the
share of non-performing loans is likely to affect capital growth. As shown in Table 1,
the Spanish banking system was very exposed to real estate development as of 2007,
with 30% of business loans being granted to that sector. In such a setting, changes in
the price of real estate are likely to affect the share of NPLs and, subsequently, capital
growth. Based on those considerations, we exploit the variation in lagged exposure to
real estate development and its interaction with the change in house prices to identify
movements in capital and growth in the share of NPLs.
Our identification strategy builds on the approach used by Watanabe (2007), who
also examines the link between bank’s capital and loan growth in the second half of the
1990s. Watanabe uses the individual bank’s share of lending to the real estate industry
in 1989 as an instrument for that bank’s capital to asset ratio in the late 1990s, as we
do.8 However, and unlike Watanabe, we control for anticipated falls in capital growth
and use the wide variation associated to changes in local house prices.
We instrumentNPLt and log Kt using variation in bank’s industrial specializa-
tion 13 years before the crisis and shortly before the beginning of the housing boom in
the late nineties. Our identifying hypothesis is that specialization in a sector generates
persistence due to informational advantages. Banks that were more specialized in bor-
rowing to real estate developers before the construction boomwere in a better position
to take advantage of the increasing demand of activity in that sector because of their
expertise. Indeed, Fig. 1 shows that those banks that were comparativelymore exposed
to real estate development in 1995 ended upwith a higher exposurewhen the slowdown
started in 2007.9 In addition, specialization in real estate development in 1995–1997
is unlikely to be correlated with demand quality in industries other than construction
in 2007. We provide evidence below in support of that identifying assumption.
Instrumenting non-performing loans
We instrument the share of non-performing loans using the fact that the profitability
of the real estate development sector is closely linked to the evolution of house prices.
In particular, falls in local house prices are a likely driver of losses of banks that were
initially exposed to real estate development. Thus, we also use as an instrument for
NPLt the interaction between the bank’s exposure to real estate developers at the
beginning of the boom and the average change in house prices in the years previous
to the bust in the provinces where the bank operates (weighted by the number of
branches in such provinces). As we also control for regional fixed effects, such inter-
action captures the drop in loan profitability within a province that is due to a bank’s
specialization in real estate development at the onset of the housing boom.
8 The underlying rationale for such instrument is similar to ours: Japanese banks substantially expanded
their lending to the real estate industry during the 1980s as a result of regulatory changes and those banks
that showed a higher shift towards this sector experienced a sharper increase in their non performing loans
ratios and a deep weakening in their capital positions ten years later when housing prices started to fall and
regulatory reforms required banks to accordingly revaluate unrealized losses.
9 Admittedly someof the institutions that dramatically expanded their lending to the real estate development
sector over the boom years were not highly exposed to this sector at the end of the past decade. Such
“latecomers” may well have suffered heavy losses and cut their lending between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q4.
However, it can also be argued that those lending institutions were picking up the borrowers with the highest
chance of defaulting.
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Fig. 1 The relationship between the weight of real estate development in 1995–1997 and the weight of the
same industry in 2007Q4. Each dot represents a combination of the share of credit to real estate developers
in business lending between 1995 and 1997 and that same share in 2007q4. Each dot is weighted by the
average of total assets between 1995 and 1997
The two first stages (for capital growth and the change in non-performing loans)
take the following form
Kt = η0 + η1Exp real
95−97+η2Exp real95−97H P RI C Et + ut (4)
N P Lt = θ0 + θ1Exp real
95−97+θ2Exp real95−97H P RI C Et + ut (5)
Note that Exp real95−97H P RI C Et may well affect N P Lt but is unlikely to
affect  log Kt . The reason is that at the beginning of a recession banks must have
accumulated reserves through dynamic provisioning, as discussed above. As a result,
recent losses will not be immediately transmitted into a lower capital growth. We test
below if Exp real95−97H P RI C Et affects capital growth—and find it does not. That
feature of the Spanish banking regulation is crucial to identify the separate impacts of
N P Lt and  log Kt on loans to non financial corporations.
4 Data and empirical specification
4.1 Data
4.1.1 Bank statements
The first sample used in this paper comes from the bank statements (balance-sheets,
profit and loss accounts) reported to the Banco de Españ a by all commercial banks and
savings banks between 1995 and 2009. We use the year 2010 in some specifications,
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but not in the main analysis because the number of banks was substantially reduced
after 2009. This information is available with (at least) a quarterly frequency at the
bank level. The bank balance sheets contain the stock of outstanding lending to firms
grouped in 23 different industries and, for each industry, we also know the share of
non-performing loans up to 2009:Q1. The information on capital requirements is only
available for the whole sample at a yearly frequency and on a consolidated basis. We
use Tier 1 capital, which includes capital, disclosed reserves, preference shares and
nonvoting equity.
Our main analysis takes as the sample unit the pair bank-industry. For example, a
bank that has outstanding loans with firms in all 23 industries contributes 23 cases
to the sample. Organizing the sample this way, we are able to control for the indus-
try specialization of banks using industry fixed effects. The summary statistics are
shown in Table 1. Our sample of domestic commercial and saving banks contain 1,357
bank-industry observations corresponding to 67 lending institutions that in 2009Q4
accounted for 77.8% of total loans granted by depository institutions, 82.5% of total
deposits and 83.7% of total assets. In turn, those 67 banks belong to 55 groups that
present consolidated balances yearly.10
4.1.2 Loan level information
Banks and firms do not match randomly, raising the concern that the link between
bank’s capital and loan growth reflect changes in the (unobserved) determinants of
the firm’s demand for credit, rather than bank’s balance sheet effects. Khwaja and
Mian (2008) or Jiménez et al. (2012) propose holding the (unobservable) quality of
a firm constant by means of firm-year fixed effects using matched data of banks and
firms. As a robustness check, we redo the analysis using loan-level data from the credit
register of Banco de España (BdE). In its supervisory role, BdE receives from lending
institutions a monthly report about outstanding loan amounts above 6,000 euro, each
classified by its type of collateral and repayment status. The version of the data we
use contains no other firm-level information, although we obtained information about
the industry of the firm as of December 2009.
We construct the loan-level sample in such a manner that each cell contains the
outstanding amount of all loans (granted and available) by bank i to firm f in period
t . In addition, drawing on the information about the industry of the borrower in 2009,
we exclude loans to other financial institutions or to the public administration. The
sample contains 1,413,531 loans from 67 institutions.
The replication of the study at the loan and industry level has value per se. Unlike
balance sheet statements, loan level data are non-existent in many countries—see
Berrospide and Edge, 2010. By conducting the analysis at both levels, we illustrate
the possible biases (if any) that researchers may incur when using data aggregated
at the bank-industry level. To our knowledge, such analysis has not been conducted
before and cast lights on the sources of differences among previous studies.
10 We have excluded bank-quarter data when credit shares in the balance-sheet are below 10% in order
to drop institutions that are not relevant for the purpose of this study. We have also excluded two savings
banks whose management was taken over by the supervisor.
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4.1.3 Provincial house prices
House prices are obtained from the series elaborated between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4
by theMinistry of Development (Ministerio de Fomento). The data consists on assess-
ments of the market value of a house made by private companies typically prior to a
mortgage concession. The Ministerio constructs the series for the main city in each
of the 50 Spanish provinces.11 We use the cumulative provincial house price growth
between the beginning of the series in 2005:Q1 and the last quarter prior to the year
when we analyze lending behavior. Aggregate house prices started falling in nominal
terms in early 2008, but in some provinces there were drops already in 2007. By using
differences between 2005 and 2008 we make sure that early falls in house prices are
included in our measures. We experiment using one year house price changes as a
proxy for H P RI C Et in a footnote below. Table 1 shows the extent of price drops
in 2008 in our sample.
4.2 Empirical specification
In line with the discussion in Sect. 3, we estimate the separate impact on business
lending growth of two different variables: the change in capital and the change in the
ratio of non-performing loans. The specification is given by the following system of
equations:
 log L Ji,t = β0 + β1N P Li,t + β2 log Ki,t +
J∑
j=0




dr1(Regioni = r) + ds Xi,t + ε ji,t (6)
 log Ki,t = α0 + α1Exp real
95−97+α2Exp real95−97H P RI C Ei,t−1
+α3H P RI C Ei,t−1 +
R∑
r=1
dr1(regioni ) + ds Xi,t + u1i,t (7)
NPLi,t = δ0 + δ1Exp real
95−97+δ2Exp real95−97H P RI C Ei,t−1
+δ3H P RI C Ei,t−1 +
R∑
r=1
dr1(regioni ) + ds Xi,t + u2i,t (8)
where L Ji,t is the amount of loans granted by bank i to industry j at time t , Ki,t is
the volume of Tier 1 capital of bank i at time t , NPLi,t is the change in the ratio
of non-performing loans, and industr j , regioni are dummy variables indicating the
industry the loan was granted to and the region where the bank has most branches as
11 We excludethe autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla located in the African continent.
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of 2006:Q3. Exp real95−97 is the bank-specific share of lending to real estate devel-
opment between 1995 and 1997.12 Xi,t includes the type of institution, the average
bank size as of 1995–1997, the capital asset ratio in 1995–1997 as well as ratio of
non-performing loans in 1998.
The coefficients of interest areβ1 andβ2. The first coefficient isolates cuts in lending
due to the anticipation of future capital drops. β2 measures how current changes in
the capital position of a bank affect its lending.
Controls related to the demand for loans We also introduce additional covariates
to control for demand quality. First, we introduce 22 industry dummies (the omitted
category is “trade”) that absorb any factor that affected the quality of the industry during
the 2008–2009 period. By including industry dummies, β1 and β2 are identified by
comparing differences in lending granted to the same industry by banks with different
capital growth (or a different variation in the share of non-performing loans). Industry
dummies control for the fact that banks specialize in industries that behave differently
over the business cycle. However our bank-industry sample cannot control for the
differences that would arise if, for example, the banks most exposed to real estate
development lent to firms whose demand for funds were most sensitive to the business
cycle. The industry fixed-effect strategy would identify a loan supply factor that is
really a demand factor. In a separate analysis we use loan-level data to examine the
robustness of the estimates once we control for the quality of borrowers by means of
firm-year dummies.
Secondly, we introduce nine regional dummies (excluded category: Madrid) based
on the region where the bank had most of its branches as of 2006:Q3. Such dummies
absorb region-specific trends that may affect lending during the sample period.
Bank-specific controls The summary statistics in Table 1 suggest that, relative to
the rest of banks, institutions involved in real estate development during 1995–1997
are less likely to be savings banks, had slightly higher capital asset ratios and a higher
share of non-performing loans back in 1995–1997. Below, we examine if our estimates
vary when we include bank specific variables measured between 1995 and 1997, the
period when initial exposure to real estate development is determined.13
Models at the consolidated and unconsolidated level Equation (6) is estimated
both by (unweighted) OLS and TSLS for the cross-section of banks in the fourth
quarter of 2009. As discussed in Sect. 4.1, in the first stage of the TSLS procedure
the change in NPLs is regressed on each bank’s historical exposure to the real estate
development sector (measured by the average of this exposure over the period 1995–
12 We identify all the mergers and acquisitions the bank undertook between 1995 and 2008Q4. We then
aggregate total outstanding loans to firms and consumers across all banks that result in the same 2008Q4
institution.We do the same for outstanding loans to real estate developers. Exposure to real estate developers
is the ratio of the second magnitude relative to the first one. Exp real95−97 is the time series average of
that ratio from 1995 through 1997.
13 In particular, themodel in theAppendix provides some clues about the role of relevant differences in bank
characteristics. Institutions with relatively higher discount rates will deliver a higher stream of dividends and
will keep lower level of capital-asset ratios. As not all institutions pay dividends, we proxy for differences
in the discount rate by using the bank-specific Tier 1 average capital asset ratio in 1995:Q1–1997:Q4. We
also include the average total asset size during the same period as well as the share of non-performing loans
to control for differences in attitudes toward risky industries (see Kashyap and Stein 2000 for evidence of
differences in lending across banks as a response to monetary policy).
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1997). In models (6) and (8) the dependent and key independent variables are defined
at the (unconsolidated) bank level—i.e. growth of credit granted or exposure to real
estate developers. On the other hand, bank capital requirements are computed at the
consolidated level. Equation (7) is thus estimated using the 55 groups that present
consolidated balances yearly. The exposure to real estate in thatmodel is also computed
at the consolidated group level. For the rest of the covariates in Equation (7) we use
the main institution of the consolidated group. The estimated capital loss for the
consolidated group is imputed to each of the 67 banks that contribute to the regression
with credit growth in the left hand side [that is, model (6)].
5 Results
5.1 The first stage for capital growth
Table 2 displays the estimates of OLS regressions of the model (4), which has as the
dependent variable the growth rate of Tier 1 capital in 2009. This specification uses the
sample of 55 consolidated groups. All specifications include regional dummies and the
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The estimate for the coefficient of
the bank’s historical exposure to the real estate sector is−0.860 and implies that banks
that were 1% more exposed to real estate development in 1995–1997 experienced a
0.86 % lower growth of Tier 1 capital between 2008:Q4 and 2009:Q4. The F-statistic
of the estimate is around 9.94, suggesting a reasonable quality of the instrument.
Interestingly, when we ran a model equivalent to that in the first column of Table
2 using the annualized growth rate of capital between 2004 and 2010 as a depen-
dent variable, the results change significantly. Figure 2 shows that the coefficient of
exposure to real estate development in 1995–1997 was basically zero prior to 2009
but turned negative in that year and in 2010. Therefore, the exposure to real estate
development between 1995 and 1997 appears to be an adequate instrument for banks’
capital growth in 2009 (and 2010).
We also estimated the first stage using not only each bank’s historical exposure
to the real estate sector but also the interaction of this variable with a measure of
the change in house prices between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4 as an instrument for each
bank’s capital growth. Columns 2–4 of Table 2 display the estimates of this alternative
approach using different sets of control variables. The impact of the interaction of
real estate development and average provincial house prices on capital growth is very
close to zero. A possible explanation is based on the timing of price drops. As already
mentioned, the legislation about loan provisioning in Spain makes it unlikely that
capital growth reflects recent losses, so changes of local house prices early in 2008
may affect capital growth only after 2009.
5.2 The first stage for NPL ratios
The ratio of non-performing loans anticipates the evolution of capital through its
impact on profits. We start by examining if the NPL ratio in 2009:Q4 is explained by
the bank’s historical exposure to real estate development as well as by the interaction
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Fig. 2 The impact of exposure to real estate development on tier 1 capital growth, by year. Each dot is
the OLS response of tier 1 capital growth to historical exposure to real estate development for each year
between 2004 and 2009 Point estimates are obtained from year-specific OLS regressions of tier 1 capital
growth on the bank’s historical exposure to real estate development (1995–1997), nine region dummies,
a dummy for savings bank and total bank assets as of 1995. The dashed lines are the limits of the 95th
confidence interval
of that variable with the average cumulative change (between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4)
of the price of real estate in the provinces where the bank operates.
The estimate of the impact of exposure to real estate developers in 1995–1997 on
the yearly change in the NPL ratio is shown in Column 2 in Table 3 (panel A), and
implies that an increase in the exposure to real estate developers from the mean of
4.0–5.0% increased the yearly change in the NPL ratio in 2009 by about 0.07% points.
However, the impact was rather heterogeneous. The interaction of past specialization
in real estate development with cumulative house price growth (row 2, column 2 in
Table 3), is negative. That is, the exposure to real estate had a positive influence on the
yearly change of the non-performing loans ratio that was mitigated by positive growth
rates in real estate prices in the provinces where the bank operated. More precisely,
the effect of exposure on the growth of the NPL ratio becomes negative for banks
settled in provinces where the average growth rate of house prices between 2005:Q1
and 2008:Q4 exceeded 23% (0.23 = 0.071.58 + 0.187). 0.187 is the average house price
increase between 2005 and 2008 (see Table 1) and it is subtracted from the house price
increases in Tables 2, 3 and 4. The results are rather stablewhenwe add further controls
for the capital asset ratio in 1995 (column 3) or the NPL ratio in 1998 (column 4).
Figure 3 provides additional insights about the year when changes in housing prices
affected NPL ratios. The figure shows OLS estimates of the response of the share of
non-performing loans to exposure to real estate development in each year during the
period 2005–2009. We evaluate the response of non-performing loans to exposure
to real estate developers by evaluating the house price change between 2005:Q1 and
2008:Q4 at the 10th centile of the distribution of changes.
We note two results in Fig. 3. Firstly, exposure to real estate development and
its interaction with house prices were not significant determinants of bank-specific
increase in the NPL ratio between 2005 and 2007—periods when national housing
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Fig. 3 The impact of exposure to real estate development on the yearly change of the NPL ratio, by year.
Each dot is the predicted yearly change in non-performing loans over outstanding credit (the NPL ratio),
evaluated at the median exposure to real estate development and the 10th centile of the distribution of bank
specific changes of house prices between 2005Q1 and the year previous to the regression. Units are percent-
age points (2 means 2% increase in the NPL ratio). We run year-specific regressions for the period between








i H P RI C Ei,t +







H Price. Dashed lines are the limits of the 95th confidence interval around each point estimate
prices were increasing. Only in 2008, 1year after the price of real estate had started
to fall in some provinces, the share of non-performing loans increased among banks
initially exposed to real estate development. The response was highest among banks
operating in provinces with lower house price increases.
As mentioned above, we find a statistically significant impact of exposure to real
estate interacted with house prices on NPLs already in 2008.14 Interestingly, among
banks exposed to real estate development, increases in loans default ratios preceded
capital losses (for which Fig. 2 only finds evidence in 2009 and 2010). This is what one
should expect, as due to regulatory reasons increases in non-performing loans affect
capital growth only with a lag.
5.3 Capital growth and business lending growth
Table 4 reports the estimates of Eq. (6) both by OLS and TSLS. In the TSLS specifica-
tion, capital growth and the change in the NPL ratio are instrumented using historical
exposure to real estate development and its interaction with changes in the price of
real estate in the provinces where banks operate.15
14 Table 3 Panel B presents the results on the change in NPLs during 2008. Cumulative housing price
growth refers now to the period between 2005:Q1 and 2007:Q4. The estimates in Panel B have the same
sign as, those in Panel A, but are smaller in magnitude.
15 The exposure to real estate mainly identifies changes in capital growth—the first and second columns of
Table 2 show a very similar estimate of the impact of real estate development on capital growth. Furthermore,
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Fig. 4 The impact of exposure to real estate development on y-o-y growth in business lending, by year.
Each dot is an estimate of the response of year on year credit growth to the bank’s specialization in real
estate development in 1995–1997. Point estimates are obtained from year-specific OLS regressions of credit
growth to a specific industry on the bank’s historical exposure to real estate development, 9 region and 23
industry dummies and a dummy for savings bank. The dashed lines are the limits of the 95th confidence
interval
The coefficient of capital growth in the OLS regression (column 1) is 0.005, very
small and statistically not different from zero. In column 2, we show the TSLS esti-
mated impact on business lending growth of capital growth, and the estimate is much
larger, 0.76 (statistically significant at the 6% confidence level). Figure 4 provides
insights about the sign and magnitude of such TSLS impact by regressing business
lending growth directly on the instrument in each year between 2005 and 2009.16 Note
that exposure to real estate development was negatively related to lending growth in
2009 and, possibly, in 2010 whereas it was not significantly different from zero in
earlier years. In other words, unlike what the OLS coefficient in Table 4 suggests,
exogenous falls in capital growth (due to the fact that banks were more exposed to real
estate development) do affect lending growth negatively .
The usual argument in the literature is that the OLS estimate of the impact of capital
growth on business lending growth is biased upward because lending and capital tend
both to contract during recessions. One would also expect an upward bias of OLS
estimates in the cross-section because banks lending to weaker firms (i.e., those that
Footnote 15 continued
the instrumented effect of capital growth on loan growth is basically the same when we only use exposure
to real estate as an instrument—and do not include the share of NPLs in the TSLS regression.
16 The reason for looking at the OLS estimate of the impact of real estate development on growth in credit
in 2009 (−0.78, depicted in Fig. 4) is that the TSLS estimate in row 2, column 2 of Table 4 should be
approximately the ratio between that estimate and the OLS estimate of real estate development on capital
growth (−0.86, in Table 2 column 1, row 1). The approximation is exact when there is one single instrument
and no covariates.
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are affectedmost by downturns in the business cycle) experience larger drops in capital.
However, in Table 4 the OLS estimate is below the TSLS one.
A possible explanation for the negative bias in the OLS coefficient in Table 4 is
that during the 2008–2009 period there was a general increase in the banks’ capital
ratios, as a result of the higher requirements by investors in financial markets and
the expectations of more strict regulatory capital requirements. In particular, markets
may have required higher capital increases for banks with worse business prospects
(i.e., banks lending to weaker firms). The joint effect of capital increases required by
financial markets and an adverse demand effect to a particular set of banks generates a
negative correlation between  log(Kt ) and ε
j
i,t , biasing downward the OLS estimate
of the effect of capital growth on lending growth.
The estimated elasticity of lending to capital is 0.76 for the whole sample of indus-
tries, and the results do not change much when we control for other pre-determined
bank characteristics, such as asset size in 1995–1997, the average capital-asset ratio
in the same period (column 3) or when we control for share of non-performing loans
in 1998 (column 4). Finally, the estimates become more precise when we exclude
construction-related industries (columns 5–7).
An elasticity of credit growth to capital growth of about 0.76 is substantially lower
than the value of 3.84 reported in Peek and Rosengreen (1995) for their whole sample
of banks. We have mentioned before that an estimate above one is hard to reconcile
with our model. A possible explanation for the discrepancy between the results is
that we hold constant anticipated capital drops by controlling for the change in non-
performing loans.
5.4 Non-performing loans and the growth of business credit
Table 4 also displays the response of business lending growth to the yearly growth
in the doubtful loans ratio, holding capital growth constant. The OLS relationship
between credit growth and the yearly change in the NPL ratio suffers from an upward
bias if banks continue lending to troubled borrowers to avoid writing off large losses
(i.e. if they incur in evergreening). Alternatively, the OLS estimate may suffer from
a negative bias if worse banks are matched with worse borrowers. We find a positive
and significant coefficient of the changes in the NPL ratio in the OLS regressions (see
Table 4, column 1).
By using 13-year lagged industry exposure, biases due to specialization in worse
customers are mitigated. Indeed, once we rely on variation in the NPL ratio asso-
ciated to historical exposure to real estate development, the growth of the NPL ratio
affects credit growth negatively. The finding suggests that credit granted to firms reacts
negatively to anticipated falls in capital.17
17 We have re-estimated the basic models in Table 2, 3 and 4 using the one year change in housing prices
instead of cumulative ones. That is, we used
Pi,2008Q4−Pi,2007Q4
Pi,2007Q4




. The impact of exposure to real estate on capital growth is 0.765 (0.38)
and the interaction of exposure and housing prices changes is 0.14, very similar to those in Table 2. For
a specification comparable to that shown in Table 3, second column we obtain an impact of real estate
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5.5 The magnitude of the estimates
Counterfactual distribution of exposure to real estate
Wequantify themagnitude of the impact of capital growth on business credit growth
by conducting the following thought experiment: Had capital growth in 2009 evolved
similarly for all banks, what would have been the growth in business lending? We
assume that all banks with exposure to real estate development above the mean had
the mean exposure in 1995–1997 (4.0%). In that scenario, the counterfactual capital
growth during 2009 would have been 10.7% (the observed one was 9.6%). The model
estimated in Table 4, column 2 delivers a counterfactual contraction of business credit
in 2009 of 3.3%, while the observed drop was of 4.0%. Thus, the lower capital growth
attributable to specialization in real estate in 1995–1997 accounts for 18% of the drop
in business credit in 2009 (0.175 = 0.04−0.0330.04 ).18
Counterfactual evolution of housing prices
To evaluate the magnitude of the effect of the increase in the NPL ratio on business
lending growth in 2009 we run a different counterfactual. What would have been
the drop in business lending had the NPL ratio evolved as predicted by the model in
column 2 of Table 3 but with house prices in 2008:Q4 staying at the 2007:Q4 level?
We first compute the growth in the share of NPLs that would have been observed if the
price of real estate had remained at the 2007:Q4 level. That level was 1.46%, while
the actual one was 1.51%. Then we used this counterfactual ratio of non-performing
loans to estimate what would have been the growth rate of lending in the alternative
scenario of zero change in the price of real estate in 2008. Even without drops in real
estate prices in 2008, the average growth rate of lending would have been −3.3%,
while the average growth of business lending in 2009 for the banks in the sample was
−4.0%. Thus, this channel would again explain around 18% (0.175 = 0.040−0.0330.04 ) of
the total contraction in loan supply in 2009.19 Rerunning the specification excluding
lending to industries related to construction, we obtain that business lending dropped
by 2.4% points, while the counterfactual with no price drop in 2008 amounts to a
1.9% points reduction. In that case, loan supply factors would contribute up to 21%
of the observed drop in 2009 (0.21 = 0.024−0.0190.024 ).
Footnote 17 continued
exposure on change in NPLs of 0.53 (0.4), while the interaction is −4.41 (1.92). Both estimates are also
close to those reported in Table 3. Finally, the estimate of the impact of exposure to real estate developers on
credit growth is similar to that reported in Table 8 Panel B. The main difference is that the TSLS estimates
were less precise than the ones we show.
18 That estimate ignores the additional effect of changes in exposure to real estate on business lending that
occurs through changes in the ratio of non-performing loans and anticipated drops in capital. However, we
only study the current capital effects in this counterfactual.
19 Perhaps surprisingly, the magnitude of the credit drop in the counterfactual with constant house prices
in 2008 is remarkably similar to that estimated when we change the distribution of exposure to real estate
in 1995–1997.
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6 The impact of the exposure to real estate development on other bank-level
outcomes
The two stage least squares (TSLS) estimates in Table 4 are valid under the assump-
tion that the instruments Exp real95−97 and Exp real95−97H P RI C Ei,t−1 affect
business lending only through their impact on contemporary and anticipated capital
growth.However, banks specialized in real estate development lendingmaydiffer from
the rest of institutions along other dimensions—say, they were especially dependent
on external liquidity. In such a case the TSLS estimates in Table 4 would partly reflect
the effect on business lending of spurious bank-level outcomes. We assess the rele-
vance of potentially confounding factors by examining the impact of the instruments
on a number of bank-level outcomes, including the share of industry-specific non-
performing loans, the growth of deposits, changes in bank liquidity and the interest
rates charged on newly granted loans.
6.1 NPL ratios by industry
A first concern refers to the possibility that banks specialized in the real estate devel-
opment sector lend disproportionately to firms prone to default at the beginning of a
recession. Jiménez et al. (2010) document that, compared to other lending institutions,
banks specialized in construction lend to small firms and grant loans that are tied to
the value of the borrowers’ real estate. A fall in the price of real estate may then harm
the collateral value of those small firms, possibly inducing firm closures (as those
firms cannot invest or get credit) and a higher share of NPLs. However, such a channel
works through the firm’s balance sheet and it is not a bank capital effect.
We address those concerns by examining the share of non-performing loans in
each industry. Assume that banks historically exposed to real estate development in
1995–1997 lent disproportionately to the firms that mechanically borrow a fraction
of their collateral. In the event of a fall in the price of real estate, those lending
institutions would experience higher than average NPLs only because their typical
customer relies on lending secured on property. Our assumption is that such reasoning
ought to operate for any industry. The alternative hypothesis that banks exposed to real
estate do not specialize in collateral-dependent firms predicts that the ratio of NPLs is
orthogonal to historical exposure to real estate development for all industries but real
estate development—which is obviously dependent on real estate prices.
Using balance sheet data of 2009:Q1 (the last period for which we have NPL ratios
disaggregated by industry) we run industry-specific versions of model (8):
NPLJi,t = δ0 + δ j1 Exp real95−97+δ
j
2 Exp real95−97H P RI C Ei,t−1
+ δ j3H P RI C Ei,t−1 + d j4 Xi,t + u ji,t (9)
If banks specialized in real estate lend to collateral-dependent firms, δ j1 will be
positive and δ j2 negative—for all industries. We plot in Fig. 5 industry-specific esti-
mates of the impact of the drops of house prices on loan repayment behavior (NPLJi,t )
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Fig. 5 The impact on the NPL ratio of real estate exposure to real estate development in 1995–1997
interacted with the change in house prices between 2005Q1 and 2008Q4. Each dot is the predicted ratio of
non performing loans over outstanding credit (NPL ratio) evaluated at the median exposure to real estate
development and the 10th centile of the distribution of bank of specific change of house prices between
2005Q1 and the year previous to the regression. Point estimates are predicted values from 22 industry-
specific OLS regressions of industry-specific share of non-performing loans on historical exposure to real
estate development, the growth between 2005Q1 and 2008Q4 of provincial house prices, region dummies
and a dummy for savings banks. Trade is excluded because the estimates were very imprecise for that
industry. Dashed lines are the limits of the 95th confidence interval
allowing for differences in the lender’s exposure to real estate. Namely, we present
δ
j
1 + δ j2HPRICEi,t−1 where HPRICEi,t−1 is the 10th centile of the price change
between 2005:Q1 and 2008:Q4 and j denotes the industry. In other words, we evaluate
the impact of exposure to real estate development on the NPL ratio in the provinces
with highest price falls.
Figure 5 shows that δ j1 + δ j2HPRICEi,t−1 is zero for all industries but real estate
development. In other terms, the banks most exposed to real estate development in
1995–1997 faced relatively worse repayment rates only from real estate developers.
Furthermore, those lower repayment chances were confined to the provinces with
the highest drops in the price of houses. In sum, the evidence is not consistent with
the hypothesis that banks exposed to real estate development were experiencing an
increase in NPLs in 2009 because their customers’ borrowing was very dependent on
their collateral.
6.2 Alternative capital measures, deposit growth, liquidity and interest rate responses
The Spanish regulator requires banks to accumulate extra provisions during expan-
sionary periods as a way of self-insuring against the risk of unrealized but latent losses
when credit is expanded, and that “dynamic provisioning” buffer is included in tier
2 capital. Hence, we also explore the impact of the bank’s exposure to real estate
development and its interaction with house prices on capital growth using this broader
measure of capital changes. The results are shown in the first two columns of Table 5
are quite similar to those in Table 2.
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6.2.1 Deposit growth and liquidity
The link between capital growth and business lending could partially capture impacts
of differences across banks in the growth of deposits or in their access to liquidity. For
example, disruptions in the functioning of the interbank market may lead less liquid
banks, or banks less able to attract depositors to cut business lending. Such confounding
factors could bias the estimates in Table 4 if banks with heavier exposure to real estate
development also experienced liquidity shortages or lower deposit growth. Table 5
presents the results of OLS equations of total deposit growth on exposure to real
estate (column 3) and its interaction with local house prices (column 4). The results
are somewhat unstable across specifications but suggest that, if anything, banks more
exposed to real estate development faced higher deposit growth (albeit the link is not
very precise).20
The last column of Table 5 examines how bank liquidity responds to exposure to
real estate development. We measure bank liquidity using balance-sheet information
on the bank’s lending position in the interbankmarket and with respect to the ECB.We
compute the value of the liquid assets as the balance of reverse repos held by the bank.
Liquid liabilities are defined as the value of assets sold under repurchase agreements.
Our measure of liquidity is the difference between both components. The estimates
in Table 5, column 5 suggest that the bank’s exposure to real estate development is a
weak predictor of the yearly change in our measure of liquidity.21
6.2.2 Interest rate responses
An alternative explanation of the findings in Table 4 is contained in Santos (2011). He
shows that banks specialized in subprime lending in the US reassessed the riskiness of
their customers during the financial crisis and, as a result, increased the interest rates
charged. In such a case, the observed fall in borrowing among their borrowers would
be partly caused by a movement along a firm’s demand curve for funds. In other terms,
the amount of loans granted fell because loan terms became tighter, not because banks
were capital constrained and cut the amount of funds lent.22 We study the role of such
risk reassessment by testing if banks exposed to real estate development in 1995–1997
granted in 2009 loans with higher interest rates.
20 Nevertheless, when we introduce the interaction between exposure and housing prices, the relationship
changes its sign. In view of the unstable relationship, we further included one year lagged deposit growth
as a regressor in a model otherwise similar to that in column (8) of Table 4. The results (not shown) were
unchanged, suggesting that the unstable relationship between deposit growth and lagged exposure to real
estate does not bias the estimates.
21 Basel III proposes a finer measure of bank liquidity that compares liquid assets (where each particular
asset receives a different weight) to liabilities due in 30 days. The information we have on the banks’ balance
sheets does not permit computing those measures in 2009.
22 Balance sheet effects can be interpreted as an inward shift of the whole loan supply curve, holding the
borrower’s quality constant. The alternative hypothesis we examine is that such inward shift is associated
instead to a reassessment of the quality of borrowers.
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We use bank-level information on the amount of new loans originated quarterly as
well as the interest rate charged by the bank on those operations.23 Table 6 shows the
results of year-specific OLS regressions of interest rates on the same set of covariates
as in Table 5. The bottom panel of Table 6 places the magnitudes in perspective by
displaying the predicted interest rates for different levels of lagged exposure to real
estate. Banks in the 10th centile of the distribution of real estate exposure charged
about 25 bp lower interest rate than banks in the 90th centile of the distribution of real
estate exposure.24 However, average interest rates on loans granted during the first
quarter of 2009 were 200 bp lower than the interest rates charged in the same period
of 2008. Compared to the 200 bp drop in interest rates between 2008 and 2009, we
doubt that the 25 bp cross-sectional difference in interest rates in 2009 can account
for the fall in business lending that we document.
6.3 Did firms reshuffle their debt portfolios?
Firms may overcome bank-specific credit supply problems by substituting loans from
stressed banks by new credit from unconstrained ones. Jiménez et al. (2010) discuss
that such behavior induces a negative correlation between a bank’s capital growth and
the growth in the amount of credit granted by that bank to a given firm. However, that
correlation is spurious and does not really reflect a cut in the total amount of credit that
a firm has available. These authors also show that debt reshuffling can be identified in
the data. Applied to our setting, their strategy amounts to comparing estimates of β1
and β2 in model (6) to similar estimates of the same model once it is aggregated at the
industry level.























 log L Jt is loangrowth at the industry level and the rest of the variables are industry-
specific averages of the covariates of interest. The test is simple. Imagine that industries
were able to replace the full amount of loans granted in t −1 by a bank with low capital
growth with new loans granted in period t by another bank with high capital growth. In
such an extreme case, changes in the total amount of loans granted to industry j would
be unaffected by the characteristics of the banks that lent to that industry in moment
t − 1. In other words, b2 would be zero. However, β2 would still be positive because
banks with low capital growth lend less to each industry than banks with high capital
23 Lending institutions provide information on interest rates split by loan size (below and above 1 million
euro) and maturity—reported in three brackets: below 1 year (some 70% of total lending) between 1 and 5
years and above 5 years. Unfortunately, not all banks provide such information, so we use a selected sample
of 45 institutions.
24 To compute the 10th and 90th centile, the distribution of real estate exposure was weighted by the mean
bank assets of the bank during the 1995-1997 period.
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Industry exposure to real estate development
Fitted values d_cr_indus_I
Fig. 6 Credit growth in 2009 and average exposure to real estate development of bank lenders-by industry.
The variable in the horizontal axis is an average of exposure to real estate in 1995–1997 across all banks
that lent to the industry in 2008Q4. The vertical axis contains annual credit growth in 2009 at the industry
level. The solid line is a set of fitted values based on a regression of credit growth to an industry on the share
of savings banks lending to that industry and the average exposure to real estate development among banks
lending to the industry. The coefficient of exposure to real estate development is −0.10 (0.06), shown in
Table 7
growth. More generally, substitution among borrowers implies that, in absolute value,
b2 < β2.
We test for debt reshuffling by adapting model (10). Namely, we regress credit
growth of industry j ( log L Jt ) on the exposure to real estate development of the
average bank lending to that industry j . That is, the regressor is the average exposure
to real estate development in 1995–1997 of all banks that were lending to industry j
in 2007. We then compare that (industry-level) estimate to the OLS estimate of the
impact of a bank’s exposure to real estate development in 1995–1997 on credit growth
using a bank-industry sample.
Figure 6 shows a scatter plot of data where the vertical axis shows credit growth of
each of the 22 industries in our sample and the horizontal axis shows towhat extent each
industry was borrowing from banks traditionally exposed to real estate development.
Clearly, industries that in 2007 borrowed relatively more from banks with traditional
expertise on lending to real estate developers experienced significantly lower credit
growth in 2009. The dependence of the amount of credit granted to an industry on the
characteristics of banks that lend to the industry is clearly at odds with the hypothesis
of debt reshuffling. The quantitative results in Table 7 reinforce the evidence in the
Fig. 6. In Table 7, column 3, row 1a, an increase of 1% point in the average exposure
to “real estate banks” at the industry level diminishes the growth in credit granted to
that industry by 10% points, much larger in absolute value than the bank-industry
estimate of bank exposure to real estate development: −0.77 in column 1 of Table 7.
We infer that while obtaining credit from alternative borrowers can be an option during
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1. Exposure to real estate
development in 1995–1997
−0.777 (0.297)** −0.882 (0.308)**
1a. Mean exposure to real estate
development (industry average)
−10.25 (6.501)*
2. Savings bank −0.071 (0.032)** −0.071 (0.032)**
2a. Mean of savings bank lending to
the industry (industry average)
−0.088 (0.015)**
3. Constant 0.0428 (0.026) 0.0154 (0.034) 0.834 (0.233)
Sample size 1,033 1,033 22
Industry fixed-effects? No Yes No
The sample used in columns 1 and 2 has as many observations as bank-industry cells we observe in 2009Q4
(67 banks, 23 industries). The sample excludes cells where lending was above the 98th centile or below the
2nd centile
The coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are estimated by OLS using the bank-industry sample. We include the
rest of the regressors mentioned in Table 4, column 7
The sample used in column 3 has as many observations as industries we observe in our sample (22 after
excluding real estate development)
The coefficients of column 3 are OLS estimates of a regression of industry credit growth in 2009 on the
average exposure to real estate development among lenders to the industry and the fraction of lenders that
are savings banks
∗∗, ∗ over the standard error of the variables of interest imply that the coefficient is significantly different
from zero at the 5 and 10 % confidence level
an expansion (as findings in Jiménez et al suggest), there were limited possibilities of
switching loan suppliers during the sample period we analyze.25
7 Exposure to real estate development and loan-level outcomes
The final set of specifications uses matched data on banks and firms to test if the
estimates in Table 4 reflect the influence of any residual variable that is correlated both
with the demand of loans and with the bank’s exposure to real estate development.
In addition, we provide some information on the distribution of loan cuts by firm
size.
25 Bentolila et al. (2013) also document, among other findings, that Spanish firms that borrowed from
weak banks at the onset of the 2008 recession were not able to replace the amount of loans granted by those
institutions with new loans from other institutions. However, Banco de España (2013) documents rather
different results. Note that we focus on banks exposed to real estate developers in 1995–1997, a set that
does not fully overlap with the set of banks that those authors examine.
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7.1 Loan level data
We examine the impact of bank’s exposure to real estate development on loan’s yearly
growth, where a loan is defined as the total liability that a firm f has with a bank i .
This specification permits the inclusion of firm-year fixed effects, which fully absorb
the solvency of a firm in a given year. We run different versions of the following model
L fi,2009 = α0 + α1Exp real95−97+α2Exp real95−97H P RI C Ei,2008




− 1 reflects year-on-year growth of the loan amount given by
bank i to firm f in 2009 and the rest of the variables have been defined already.26 By
including the firm-year fixed effect θ f , the coefficient α1measures if the banks that
were most exposed to real estate development in 1995–1997 cut more their lending
to a given firm than the rest of lending institutions. Furthermore, we also examine
the robustness of the parameters of interest—α1 and α2—in models that include and
exclude the firm fixed-effect θ f . If the magnitude of the estimates α1 and α2 are
not altered by the inclusion of the exhaustive set of firm quality indicators θ f one
can establish that Exp reali,95−97 and Exp reali,95−97H P RI C Ei,2008 are indeed
orthogonal to the solvency of the borrowers. In other words, exposure to real estate
developers back in 1995–1997 reflects actual shocks to the banks’ loan supply curve
in 2009.27
The results in Table 8 show that controlling for the unobserved quality of borrowers
by means of firm-level fixed effects does not affect the role of exposure to real estate
development in reducing credit supply. The estimate of α1 is shown in Table 8 Panel
A, and amounts to −1.93 (standard error: 0.62) when we do not include firm fixed
effects. That is, a 1% increase in the bank’s exposure to real estate development in
1995–1997 reduces lending growth in 2009 by 1.93%. Once we include firm fixed
effects, the estimate is −1.857 (standard error: 0.811), a remarkably similar estimate.
Furthermore, the inclusion of firm-year fixed effects increases the R squared of model
(11) from 2 to 68%. The robustness of the estimate of Exp real95−97 once we account
for a large share of unobservables strongly suggests that the non-random matching of
firms and banks is definitely not driving our estimates of the impact of exposure to
real estate development on business credit growth.
The estimate of α2 is 14.03 (st. error 3.64), positive and precisely estimated. The
estimate implies that banks specialized in real estate development as of 1995–1997
26 We do not use logs because 9% of firms in our sample did not have any loan in 2009, and such transition
may be an effect of the contraction of bank’s loan supply. Those cases would be missing in a sample that
uses logs.
27 We weight each cell by L fi,2008 to achieve comparability of the estimates with the analysis at the bank-
industry level. The average of the bank-firm specific rates of growth in lending weighted by L fi,2008 is
identical to the aggregate rate of credit growth in 2009, because STATA automatically rescales weights by
the total sum in the sample.
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cut their lending more in 2009, and that the drop in lending was mitigated if those
banks operated in provinces with lower house price increases. To provide a sense
of the magnitude of the estimate, assume that a bank has an exposure to real estate
development in 1995–1997 at the samplemean (0.040) and that it operates in provinces
with the average house price increase of 15% between 2005 and 2008. Another bank
operating in the same provinces but with a 1% higher exposure to real estate lending
would reduce the amount of loans granted in 2009 by 1.84% more (1.84 = −1.93 +
14.03 * 0.15). If both banks operated instead in a set of provinces with a 5% increase
in housing prices (the 10th decile of house price increases), the differential fall in
business lending granted by the bank with the highest exposure would be 1.90%
instead (1.90 = −1.93 + 14.03 * 0.05). Albeit statistically significant, the impact of
the bank’s exposure to real estate development on business lending is not very different
in provinces in the bottom decile of the price change (1.90% drop in business lending)
and at the mean house price change (1.84% drop).
Two notes are in order. Firstly, the magnitude of the estimate of α2 does not depend
at all on whether or not we control by firm fixed effects. The estimate is 12.64 (the
standard error is 5.41) with firm-year fixed effects and 14.03 without them. The result
has a very interesting interpretation. Firm-year fixed effects absorb the impact of
changes in house prices in the location of the firm. Hence, the finding that α2 remains
unaffected when we include firm-year fixed effects indicates that the cut in business
lending is exclusively driven by the evolution of housing prices in the provinces where
the bank (rather than the firm) operates. That result suggests that a fall in the price of
real estate in a region where banks operate results in a reduction of business loans in
other regions where the same bank lends. That is, local real estate shocks propagate
to the loan supply in other regions through the bank’s balance sheets.
In addition, Table 8 permits an explicit comparison between estimates of model
(11) estimated at the bank-loan level and estimates of the same coefficients on a bank-
industry sample. The estimates in the top panel—obtained in a sample that matches
banks and firms—are remarkably similar to those in the bottom panel—obtained in
a sample that matches banks and industries sample. The robustness of the estimates
across disaggregation levels and estimation methods confirms that banks exposed
to real estate developers at the beginning of the boom shifted inward their credit
supply curve, holding borrower’s quality constant. More generally, the invariance
of results across samples does suggest that bank-industry data goes a long way in
detecting bank balance sheet effects. This is an important result, as bank-level data is
typically the only information available in countries that lack comprehensive credit
registers.
7.2 The distribution of the fall in business lending
The use of loan level data permits an assessment of the distribution of the cut in
business lending across firms of different sizes. Namely, we can estimate the impact
of bank’s specialization in real estate development in 1995–1997 on the evolution
of credit granted to firms with different sizes. We conduct the exercise by matching
credit registers to information on the balance sheet data of firms that borrow. Using
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firm identifiers, we achieved successful matches for about 40% of the Credit Register
Records—consistent with previous studies.
Table 9 presents regression models like the one in (11), but now providing separate
estimates of the impact by firm size. A 1% increase in specialization in real estate
reduces loan growth by 4% among firms with less than three employees (Table 9,
Panel A, row 1 column 2). The corresponding estimate among the largest set of firms
(250 + workers) is 3.3 and 2.7% among firms with 50−250 employees. However, the
estimates are not statistically different from each other. Those estimates are at odds
with the hypothesis that small firms are especially sensitive to cuts in bank lending.
8 Conclusions
Bank credit to the non-financial private sector in the Spanish economy has slowed
sharply, fromannual growth rateswell above20% in2007 tonegativefigures registered
at the trough of this cycle. The assessment of the relative contributions of demand and
supply-side factors faces two main obstacles. The first is that Bank Lending Surveys,
the sources of information that explicitly distinguished between supply and demand
factors, aremainly qualitative. Secondly, business credit and bank balance sheetsmove
simultaneously along the cycle.
This paper analyzes whether banks’ contemporary and expected capital growth
influences loan supply to a given industry and/or firm. We argue that the deleverag-
ing process under way in the banking system (driven both by expectations of higher
regulatory capital requirements and by greater demands from financial markets) in
the case of some banks might have not been enough to meet the increase in capital
requirements. This is likely to be the case for those institutions with limited access
to market funding, either because of institutional limitations or as a consequence of
higher perceived risk (as might be the case, for instance, of banks with a high exposure
to real estate developers). These institutions might have been able to raise own funds
only by retaining profits, and this channel might have been insufficient to reach the
desired level of capital. Under these circumstances, these banks might have had to cut
back on their lending.
Using financial statements for a sample of Spanish banks matched to registers of
business credit at the bank-industry and bank-firm level, we have estimated different
specifications for the separate impact of changes in banks’ actual and expected capital
growth on bank lending. We have used an instrumental variable approach together
with industry-year and firm-year fixed-effects to control for the simultaneity of supply
and demand factors. We show that the historical exposure to real estate development
is a good instrument for banks’ actual capital growth and that lagged exposure and
its interaction with local housing prices affects the share of NPLs and, hence, future
capital growth. Overall, banks’ capital growth has been a relevant factor in explaining
loan supply in 2009 and, possibly, in 2010. Our estimates imply that the elasticity of
credit growth to capital growth lies between 0.7 and 0.8.Our interpretation is that banks
that have experienced capital shortfalls or banks that have increased their capital but
without reaching the level demanded by financial markets might have had no option
but to reduce their lending.
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The assessment of the magnitude of the effect suggests that the contraction in
lending stemming from the deterioration in banks’ capital position associated with
the fall in house prices accounts for between 18 and 21% of the observed decline
in lending growth in 2009. The relatively small magnitude of this effect is explained
by the weakness of loan demand in a context of deep recession. However, as loan
demand reacts to the economic recovery, the capital position of particular institutions
might have become more binding and this channel might have gained in strength in
subsequent years. Future work could then examine if the more recent changes in house
prices and their interaction with banks’ specialization patterns has affected outcomes
other than the supply of credit, such as employment levels.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix
Themodel is adapted fromVan denHeuvel (2002).An infinitely-lived bankmaximizes
the expected stream of dividends dt . The bank borrows at an interest rate rt and keeps a
level of capital Kt . The bank uses those funds to lend an amount Lt to firms obtaining a
return R(Lt ) per unit lent.We further assume that the returns R(Lt ) is decreasing in Lt .
The level of bank’s capital can be increased by retaining post-tax profits (1 − τ)πt+1
and it diminishes when the bank pays dividends.
We assume that the level of capital must exceed a minimum legal amount that is a
fraction of the bank’s total amount lent γL L plus an amount required by the markets










s.t.Kt+1 = Kt + (1 − τ)πt+1 − dt
πt+1 = [R(Lt ) − rt ]Lt + dt − Kt
Kt − dt ≥ (γL + γU )Lt
dt ≥ 0
The value function can be written as follows
V (Kt+1) = max{d,L} dt +
1
1 + rt [V (Kt ) + (1 − τ)πt+1 − dt ]
s.t. Kt − dt ≥ (γL + γU )Lt (ϕt )
s.t. dt ≥ 0 (θt )
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The first order conditions of the problem are the following
∂ϑ
∂dt




− ϕt + θt = 0
∂ϑ
∂Lt




[R′(Lt ) − rt ] − ϕt (γL + γU ) = 0
where ϑ is the Lagrangian of the constrained maximization problem and V is the
value function. The first condition says that the dividend policy must be such that the
benefit of distributing one additional euro must equal the associated cost: less capital
accumulated for next period and less funds available for lending, on top of the cost
when the regulatory constraint binds ϕt or the financial constraint that no additional
capital can be raised (θt ).
The second condition shows that banks must lend until the return of the last euro
invested equals its cost, both in terms of the cost of funding rt and the cost in terms
of the capital requirement.
Finally, the envelope theorem condition is the following:
∂Vt
∂Kt





We start by examining the case when the financial constraint does not bind—or
θt = 0. In that case, combining the envelope condition and the first order condition
for the dividend policy, one obtains that ∂Vt
∂Kt
= 1, which in turn implies that
ϕt = τrt
1 + rt (12)
And the lending policy is:
M R(Lt ) = rt − τrt
1 + rt (γL + γU ) (13)
We denote L∗t as the amount of lending that solves (13). Importantly, the lending
policy is determined by the marginal cost of funds, that combines the cost of raising
funds and the cost of the regulatory constraint. The amount of lending does not depend
on the capital position of the bank. If τ = 0, the regulatory constraint does not even
enter the decision of how much to lend.
It can be shown that in this setting, the regulatory constraint always binds, as
carrying excess capital is suboptimal under perfect certainty.
We assume that there is an initial distribution of values γ 0U . Assume that either
because capital markets require higher capital levels or because higher losses due to
a change in the expectations about housing prices, the capital level of the bank falls
short of the new amount needed, i.e., for all banks such that
Kt + dt = (γ 0U + γL)L∗t < (γ 0U + γL)L∗t
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Hence, in the new regime, L∗t does not satisfy the regulatory constraint and the
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